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Abstract
Previous research has shown that rapid vocal repetition of a one-word version of negative
self-referential thought reduces the stimulus functions (e.g., emotional discomfort and
believability) associated with that thought. The present study compares the effects of that
defusion strategy with thought distraction and distraction-based experimental control
tasks on a negative self-referential thought. Non-clinical undergraduates were randomly
assigned to one of three protocols. The cognitive defusion condition reduced the
emotional discomfort and believability of negative self-referential thoughts significantly
greater than comparison conditions. Favorable results were also found for the defusion
technique with participants with elevated depressive symptoms.
Key Words: acceptance; Acceptance and Commitment Therapy; believability; cognitive
defusion; emotional discomfort; mindfulness; self-referential thoughts; thought
distraction
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1. Introduction
In recent years, acceptance- and mindfulness-based interventions (see Hayes,
Follette, & Linehan, 2004) have been widely discussed and studied in the field of
cognitive behavior therapy (CBT). As a group, these therapies generally focus more on
the functional effects of private events (e.g., thoughts, feelings, physiological sensations,
memories) than on content and frequency of these events in understanding and treating
psychopathology (e.g., Fisher & Wells, 2005; Linehan, 1993; Segal, Teasdale, &
Williams, 2004). An example of these interventions is Acceptance and Commitment
Therapy (ACT) (Hayes, Strosahl, & Wilson, 1999).
ACT includes various techniques to change the function of private events in order
to promote psychological health (e.g., Hayes, Luoma, Bond, Masuda, & Lillis, 2006).
One set of techniques used particularly for this purpose are cognitive defusion strategies
(see Luoma & Hayes, 2009). Cognitive defusion is roughly conceptualized as altering the
literal meaning and behavior-regulatory function of private events without necessarily
altering the form, frequency, or situational sensitivity of these events (Blackledge, 2007).
In ACT, defusion techniques are often employed in contexts where clients are
excessively entangled or fused with their private events, such as negative self-referential
thought (e.g., “I am depressed”; “I” = “depression”).
Control-based strategies, such as avoidance, thought suppression, and distraction
are conventional coping methods for unwanted private events (Hayes, Wilson, Gifford,
Follette, & Strosahl, 1996). Research has shown that these strategies, which directly
target the form and frequency of unwanted private events, may be ineffective and
potentially paradoxical (e.g., Eifert & Heffner, 2003; Gutiérrez, Luciano, Rodríguez, &
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Fink, 2004). Among these, the iatrogenic effect is especially clear in the case of
suppression methods (e.g., Feldner, Zvolensky, Eifert, & Spira, 2003; Levitt, Brown,
Orsillo, & Barlow, 2004; Marcks & Woods, 2007). For example, in a study by Marcks
and Woods, 2005 participants instructed to suppress their personally relevant intrusive
thoughts were found to report difficulty in doing so and increased distress after
suppression attempt. For this reason, ACT aims at strengthening the process of cognitive
defusion for difficult private events, instead of employing control-based coping strategies.
Several focused studies have investigated the effects of specific cognitive
defusion techniques on negative self-referential thoughts (e.g., Healy et al., 2008;
Masuda, Hayes, Sackett, & Twohig, 2004; Masuda et al., 2009). One study investigated
the effects of a commonly used cognitive defusion technique, “I am having a thought
that…” (Healy et al., 2008). The study suggests that negative self-referential statements
(e.g., “my life is pointless”) when presented in the defused format (e.g., “I am having a
thought that my life is pointless”) can decrease the emotional discomfort associated with
that statement and increase willingness to be exposed to these statements.
Another study examined the effects of rapid vocal repetition of a one-word
version of a negative self-referential thought—another commonly used defusion
technique (Masuda et al., 2004). This technique is derived from the observation that when
a word is rapidly repeated out loud, the context required for the word to have its literal
meaning is altered, and the literal meaning of the word disappears (Titchener, 1910). In
the study, the defusion protocol consisted of a defusion rationale, training, and 30-second
rapid vocal repetition of a one-word version of the negative self-referential thought. The
defusion condition was compared to a distraction-based experimental control task
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(reading an article on Japan) and thought control task. Primary dependent variables were
reductions in emotional discomfort and believability of the self-referential negative
thoughts. Results revealed that the defusion condition decreased the stimulus functions
(i.e., emotional discomfort and believability) associated with these thoughts more so than
comparison conditions across all participants.
A subsequent group parametric study examined whether the duration of one-word
thought repetition systematically altered the impact of this defusion strategy (Masuda et
al., 2009). The reduction of emotional discomfort was found to bottom out after 3 to 10
seconds of rapid repetition, whereas the maximum reduction of believability occurred
after 20 to 30 seconds of repetition. These findings additionally suggest that the actual
experiential exercise of rapid thought repetition is crucial for altering the stimulus
function of negative self-referential thoughts, and that emotional discomfort and
believability may be distinctive functional aspects of cognitive events.
While interesting and encouraging, previous studies did not clearly reveal the
relative effects of rapid thought repetition. Although the original defusion study (Masuda
et al., 2004) reported the superiority of the defusion condition to comparison conditions,
multiple treatment interference likely occurred because each participant in the study
received multiple interventions. Additionally, the thought-control condition in the study
was employed for controlling gross demand characteristics. The subsequent parametric
study (Masuda et al., 2009) did not compare the defusion protocol with an active
comparison condition, either.
Additionally, the effects of this cognitive defusion technique have not been
examined in clinical or sub-clinical samples. To date, there are several focused
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experimental studies reporting the positive effects of an acceptance-based emotion
regulation strategy in clinical samples with emotional disorders (Campbell-Sills, Barlow,
Brown, & Hofmann, 2006; Liverant, Brown, Barlow, & Roemer, 2008). These results are
relevant to the present study in part because the acceptance-based strategy shares aims
with defusion strategies (i.e., changes in the stimulus function of aversive private events).
Given the lack of empirical evidence, it is worthwhile to investigate the effects of
defusion using a subgroup from a non-clinical sample, such as non-clinical college
undergraduates who report elevated psychological symptoms.
As a response to these emerging questions, the present study investigates the
relative impact of the cognitive defusion technique (i.e., rapid thought repetition) on a
self-referential negative thought, as compared to a thought distraction strategy. The
present study had several methodological and conceptual advantages over previous
defusion studies (Masuda et al., 2004; Masuda et al., 2009). The study employed a group
design format in order to reduce extraneous variables, such as multiple treatment
interference, and it more clearly identified the active comparison condition. The thought
distraction strategy, which is roughly defined as an effort of selectively attending to an
emotionally less distressing event or situation (Gross, 1998), was selected as the active
comparison condition for several reasons. First, a distraction technique is a defined
control strategy (e.g., McCaul & Malott, 1984) that appears theoretically distinct from
cognitive defusion because of its primary focus on reducing the frequency of an
unwanted private event by shifting attention away from it. Second, distraction can be an
appropriate active comparison condition because it has been found effective in some
contexts, especially in the situations of mildly and moderately aversive events (e.g.,
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Gutiérrez et al., 2004). Finally, the distraction-based experimental control condition (e.g.,
reading an article about Japan) was also added to the study as a control group in order to
control non-specific factors. Based on previous research findings (e.g., Gutiérrez et al.
Masuda et al., 2004; Masuda et al., 2009), it was hypothesized that the cognitive defusion
condition would reduce the emotional discomfort and believability of negative selfreferential thoughts greater than the comparison conditions. It was further predicted that
positive effects of cognitive defusion also would be seen among participants who
reported “elevated depressive symptoms.”
2. Method
2.1. Participants and Settings
The study was conducted at a large public 4-year university in Georgia.
Participants were 132 students (77%, n Female = 102) recruited from undergraduate
psychology courses through a web-based research participant pool. The age of the
participants ranged from 17-60 years (M = 20.91, SD = 6.96). The ethnic composition of
the sample was diverse with 39% (n = 50) identifying as “European American,” 33% (n =
43) identifying as “African American,” 14% (n = 19) identifying as “Asian
American/Pacific Islander American,” 9% (n = 11) identifying as “Hispanic American,”
and 5% (n = 7) identifying as “other” or “bicultural.”
2.2. Demographic and Screening Form
Following the consent procedure, participants completed a demographic form and
the BDI-II. The demographic variables included gender, age, and ethnicity.
2.2.1. Beck Depression Inventory II.
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The Beck Depression Inventory-II (BDI-II) (Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996) is often
used as a screening form for general psychological functioning. The measure appeared to
be particularly relevant because of the link between negative self-referential thoughts (the
dependent variables of the study) and depression (the event measured by the BDI-II). The
BDI-II is a 21-item self-report questionnaire that is designed to assess recent depressive
symptoms. Each item is rated using a 4-point severity scale, ranging from 0 to 3. The
total score ranges from 0 to 63 with greater scores suggesting greater depressive
symptoms. The BDI-II has shown good test-retest reliability (r = .93) and has
demonstrated a high correlation with the original BDI (r = .93, Beck et al, 1996). In the
present study, the mean BDI-II score was used as the cutoff for selecting a sub-sample of
participants with elevated depressive symptoms.
2.3. Thought Selection and Assessment
Following completion of the demographic form and the BDI-II, thought selection
and assessment was conducted. Thought selection and assessment were administered by
research investigators who were trained by the first author. The procedure and instruction
of the thought selection and procedure was closely scripted. The participant was given an
assessment form and orally instructed to generate one negative self-referential thought
that had entered the participant’s mind repeatedly and regularly and that had been found
particularly disturbing and believable (e.g., “I am not pretty”). Participants were then
asked to restate the thought in one word (e.g., “ugly”). The degree of emotional
discomfort and the believability of the thought were assessed using a 100-mm Likertstyle visual analog scale before and immediately after the intervention. Responses ranged
from 0 (not at all uncomfortable) to 100 (very uncomfortable) for the discomfort scale,
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and from 0 (not at all believable) to 100 (very believable) for the believability scale. If
participants could not come up with a thought that was above 50 on the discomfort or 50
on believability scales, they were prompted to identify another negative self-referential
thought that was more uncomfortable and believable. Participants, who could not come
up with a thought that was above 50 on the discomfort or 50 on believability scales after
the prompt, were eliminated in order to fit participants to the purpose of the present
investigation. Participants were not informed of the inclusion criteria.
2.4. Procedure
Participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions: (a) cognitive
defusion, (b) thought distraction, and (c) distraction-based experimental control (control)
tasks. All of these intervention conditions were 5 minutes long and closely scripted.
Investigators ran participants in all conditions to minimize experimenter effects.
Experimenters were trained by the first author who is a licensed clinical psychologist and
has extensive research experience. A weekly research meeting was held to ensure
adherence to the scripted intervention.
Both active interventions were equal in (a) components, (b) duration (5-minutes),
(c) sequence of components, (d) contents of training (e.g., the use of the word “milk”
highlighting the use of the assigned strategy), and (e) the number of prompts given during
the intervention phase. A distraction-based experimental control condition was added to
the current work to control non-specific factors, such as the duration of the contact with
the experimenter.
2.4.1. Cognitive Defusion Condition.
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The cognitive defusion task consisted of the defusion rationale, defusion training,
and a 30-second rapid vocal repetition of the one-word target thought. The rationale and
training were drawn from the original ACT book (Hayes et al., 1999). The defusion
rationale identified the positive aspects of human verbal behavior (e.g., thinking,
language), but also addressed the role of language and thinking in human suffering. The
participant was told that a distressing self-referential thought may be relatively automatic
and that people often identify themselves with the literal content of their thoughts. To
exemplify this, defusion training was introduced where the participant was initially asked
to say the word "milk" once and to notice all of its perceptual functions (e.g., “white,”
“cold,” “creamy”). The participant was then instructed to repeat the word "milk" out loud
as rapidly as possible for 20 seconds. The participant was told to notice what happens to
the perceptual functions during the word repetition. Participants typically reported that
the meaning of the word began to disappear, and most participants noted that more direct
functions appeared (e.g., “The word milk did not mean anything.” “It became just a
sound.”). The experimenter then suggested that this defusion experience could be
applicable to the participant’s self-referential negative thought, indicating that negative
thoughts are also simply sounds with conventional meanings. The participant was then
asked to repeatedly state the one-word self-referential negative thought (e.g., “fat”) aloud
as fast as possible until informed to stop. The experimenter said, "stop" after 30 seconds
passed. As in Masuda et al. (2004), to maintain engagement in this condition, the
experimenter provided a verbal prompt (i.e., "faster" and "louder") to the participant after
10 and 20 seconds.
2.4.2. Thought Distraction Condition.
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The thought distraction condition consisted of a thought distraction rationale,
distraction training, and the actual attempt at distracting from the target negative selfreferential thought. The thought distraction condition began with a statement suggesting
that cognitions cause and trigger actions and emotions, and that negative thoughts are the
source of human suffering, followed by a statement suggesting that distracting oneself
from negative thoughts by thinking of something different is a solution. After the brief
rationale, the participant received thought distraction training using the word, “milk.”
Similar to the defusion condition, the participant was asked to say the word "milk" once
and to notice all of its perceptual functions (e.g., “white,” “cold,” “creamy”). Then, the
participant was instructed not to think of the word “milk” by thinking of something
emotionally neutral or less unpleasant for about 20 seconds. After briefly discussing the
usefulness and credibility of the distraction strategy on the word “milk,” the experimenter
then suggests applying this experience to his or her negative self-referential thought in
order to prevent psychological suffering. Prior to the actual use of the thought distraction
strategy on the target thought, the participant was first asked to say the one-word version
of that thought once to focus on the target thought. The participant was then instructed to
distract from the target negative self-referential thought by thinking of something else
until the experimenter said “stop.” As in the defusion condition, in order to maintain
engagement in this condition, the experimenter provided a verbal prompt (i.e., "don’t
think about it") to the participant after 10 and 20 seconds. The experimenter said "stop"
after 30 seconds passed.
Because of the potentially greater variation of actual distraction strategies and the
quality of such attempts relative to the cognitive defusion condition, a brief experimental
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manipulation check was conducted for the thought distraction group at post-experiment.
Participants were asked what they had tried to think about during distraction, and how
successful they were at it using a 3- point scale, ranging from 0 (not being able to do so
at all), 1 (somewhat being able to do so), to 2 (being able to do so well). Examples of the
distracting thought contents included upcoming pleasant events (e.g., Thanksgiving, a
friend’s birthday), something neutral, such as thinking about the next scheduled
appointment, and stimuli in the experimental room, such as the door or window. Even
though the content varied, the attempts fit the conceptualization of thought distraction as
an effort of selectively attending to an emotionally less distressing event or situation
(Gross, 1998). The average rating was 1.35 (SD = .66), falling in the range between
somewhat able and very well able to distract themselves from the target thoughts.
2.4.3. Distraction-based Experimental Control Condition.
The experimental control condition (control condition) did not include a rationale.
The condition involved reading an emotionally neutral article about Japan (i.e., vacations
to the mountains) for 5 minutes.
3. Results
3.1. Characteristics of Sample
The mean score for the 132 participants on the BDI-II, which was used to assess
participants’ general psychological functioning at pre, was 9.09 (SD = 7.64). The score
fell in the average range of a non-clinical population. Of the 132 participants who were
randomly assigned to the cognitive defusion (n = 41), thought distraction (n = 48), or
control condition (n = 43), 15 participants (defusion = 5, thought distraction = 6, &
control = 4) were excluded due to extraneous methodological factors. Specifically, 13 of
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these participants were excluded because of difficulty in identifying a negative selfreferential thought or inability to follow instructions. Two participants (one from each
active condition) discontinued their participation prior to the completion of assessment
because they expressed elevated levels of frustration and became argumentative toward
the experimenter. Furthermore, an additional 14 participants (defusion = 5, thought
distraction = 4, & distraction-based experimental control = 5) were excluded at the time
of data analyses because of the inclusion criteria (i.e., 50 or greater in both emotional
discomfort and believability at pre-intervention). Results were equivalent when the data
of the 14 participants were included in the following data analyses.
As a result, 103 participants with relatively high degrees of emotional discomfort
and believability were left for data analyses; cognitive defusion (n = 31), thought
distraction (n = 38), and distraction-based experimental control condition (n = 34). Of
those, 76% were females (n = 78). The age of the participants ranged from 17-60 years
(M = 21.17, SD = 7.72). The final sample was ethnically diverse with 38% (n = 39)
identifying as “European American,” 30% (n = 31) identifying as “African American,”
17% (n = 17) identifying as “Asian/Pacific Islander,” 11% (n = 11) identifying as
“Hispanic American,” and 4% (n = 4) identifying as “other” or “bicultural.”
3.2. Pre-intervention Group Differences & the Effects of Potential Confounding Factors
Chi-square testes and ANOVAs revealed that the groups did not differ in the
compositions of gender and ethnicity background. BDI-II score, the age of participants,
and pre-intervention emotional discomfort and believability (p > .10), did not differ
significantly by group. Furthermore, results of two 4 (i.e., experimenters) by 2 (i.e., time)
repeated measures ANOVAs revealed no main effect of experimenter or interaction of
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time and experimenter in the emotional discomfort or believability of negative selfreferential thoughts, Fs < 1.17, ps > .32.
3.3. Effects on Self-Referential Negative Thoughts
The means, standard deviations, and effect sizes of emotional discomfort and
believability scores for all conditions are presented in Table 1. The results for the
emotional discomfort and believability of the negative self-referential thoughts were
analyzed separately, using two 3 (condition: cognitive defusion, thought distraction, &
control condition) by 2 (time: pre- and post-intervention) repeated measure ANOVAs.
3.3.1. Emotional Discomfort.
Results showed a main effect for time, F(1, 100) = 129.16, p < .001, and a two way
interaction between condition and time, F(2, 100) = 5.15, p < .01 (see Figure 1). The
interaction was decomposed both by looking at the effects of time across each condition
and by looking at the effects of condition at each time point. Emotional discomfort at
post-intervention was found to be significantly lower than pre-intervention emotional
discomfort across all conditions (F’s > 15, ps < .001). Pairwise comparisons revealed that
at post, the defusion group reported significantly lower levels of emotional discomfort
than the thought distraction group (p < .05) and distraction-based experimental control
group (p < .001). The thought distraction group reported significantly lower emotional
discomfort than the experimental control group (p < .05).
3.3.2. Believability.
Almost identical results were found in the believability of the negative selfreferential thoughts with one exception. In the believability of negative self-referential
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thought, no group difference between thought distraction and experimental control
groups were found at post-intervention (p > .05).
3.4. Effects on Individuals with Elevated Depressive Symptoms
The mean score of BDI-II in 103 participants was 9.9 (SD = 8.18). As a result,
using the BDI-cut off score of 10, 42 participants were selected as participants with
elevated depressive symptoms; cognitive defusion (n = 14), thought distraction (n = 10),
and distraction experimental control condition (n = 18). An ANOVA revealed that BDI-II
score did not significantly differ by group (p > .19).
3.4.1. Emotional Discomfort.
The means, standard deviations, and effect sizes of emotional discomfort and
believability scores for all conditions among those with elevated depressive symptoms
are presented in Table 2. Given a significant group difference of emotional discomfort at
pre-intervention, an analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) on post-intervention emotional
discomfort, covarying the pre-treatment levels of emotional discomfort was performed.
Results revealed the main effect of condition, F(2, 38) = 4.73, p < .05. Pairwise
comparisons revealed that the cognitive defusion group had significantly lower emotional
discomfort than the experimental control condition (p < .01) Pairwise comparisons did
not reveal other significant group differences.
3.4.2. Believability.
A 3 (condition: cognitive defusion, thought distraction, & control condition) by 2
(time: pre- and post-intervention) repeated measure ANOVA revealed the main effect for
time, F(1, 100) = 129.16, p < .001. Pairwise comparisons revealed a significant reduction
of believability at post-treatment as compared to pre-treatment (p < .001). The time by
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condition interaction effect was not found to be significant, F(2, 39) = 2.57, p = .089.
However, at post-intervention, a medium effect size (d = -.65) was found in the
comparison between cognitive defusion and thought distraction conditions, and a large
effect size (d = -.99) was found in the comparison between cognitive defusion and
experimental control conditions. Both of these results favored the cognitive defusion
condition.
3.5. Exploratory Analyses on the Role of Depressive Symptoms
Because similar patterns were found between the overall participant group and the
subgroup with elevated depressive symptoms, the roles of depressive symptom (i.e., BDIII scores) on negative self-referential thoughts and the effects of intervention were further
investigated. A correlational analysis, using the overall sample of 103 participants,
revealed that the depressive symptom (BDI scores) was not a predictor of emotional
discomfort (r =.06, p = .53) or believability (r =.08, p = .44) at post-intervention.
Subsequently, a hierarchical regression analysis was conducted separately for each postintervention outcome to investigate depressive symptom as a moderator of the relations
between intervention and that outcome variable. In the analysis, the variable of interest at
pre-intervention was entered into the first step, followed by depressive symptom in the
second step. Subsequently, intervention condition (i.e., categorized as 1 = defusion, 2 =
thought distraction, & 3 = control condition) was entered in the third step. Finally,
depressive symptom and the interaction term were entered in the third step. Results
revealed that depressive symptom was not found to be a moderator of the relations
between intervention and post-intervention emotional discomfort (β =-.02, t = -.08, p
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= .93) or between intervention and post-intervention believability (β =-.16, t = -.70, p
= .49).
4. Discussion
Consistent with previous cognitive defusion studies (Masuda et al., 2004; Masuda
et al., 2009), the present study suggests that the rapid repetition of a one-word version of
a self-referential negative thought, combined with a clinical rationale and training,
reduces the emotional discomfort and believability of that thought at least temporarily.
The present investigation is the first to show the superior effects of the defusion
procedure over a thought distraction strategy, a control-based coping method that is
commonly employed by clients prior to seeking treatment. Exploratory analyses suggest
that depressive symptoms do not predict outcome variables at post-intervention or
moderate the relation between the present interventions and these post-intervention
outcomes. The defusion protocol was also found to effectively reduce the believability
and emotional discomfort associated with negative self-referential thought among
individuals with elevated depressive symptoms. In conclusion, the study suggests that,
regardless of the levels of depressive symptom, the cognitive defusion technique is an
effective strategy for altering the stimulus function of negative self-referential thought in
a non-clinical sample. Given this encouraging finding, it may be worthwhile to
investigate whether the present positive finding is generalized to a clinical sample with
depression in future research.
Further research is needed to clarify the difference between cognitive defusion
and thought distraction strategies due to the lack of functional distinctions between the
two active strategies. The present study revealed that although the effects of thought
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distraction were smaller than those of the cognitive defusion condition, its effects on
emotional discomfort and believability of negative self-referential thoughts appeared
significant compared to the control condition. These findings were somewhat surprising
because a distraction strategy and cognitive defusion technique were thought to be
functionally different from each other.
Several speculations can be drawn regarding the positive effects of thought
distraction. One speculation is that so-called acceptance and mindfulness strategies, such
as cognitive defusion, are not fundamentally different from control-based coping
strategies, although its aims are said to be fundamentally unique (process- and functionfocused). As some experts in CBT (e.g., Hoffmann & Asmundson, 2008) suggest, the
differences might be simply the matter of degree.
Alternatively, the lack of the functional distinction was in part due to the nature of
the negative self-referential thoughts. More specifically, the effects of the two strategies
may be moderated by the severity of target private events. Literature on pain tolerance
has shown that a distraction strategy is an effective coping strategy for mild or moderate
pains, but not for severe ones (McCaul & Malott, 1984). A previous comparison
experiment between an acceptance strategy and distraction strategy on pain tolerance
revealed that both interventions were equally effective in a lower pain context, but that
the superiority of an acceptance-based condition emerged in the context of greater pain
intensity (Gutierrez et al., 2004). Given these previous findings, it was speculated that the
lack of functional distinction between the two active conditions in the present study
might have been in part because of negative self-referential thoughts that were not
disturbing enough. In fact, integrity checks revealed that the majority of participants in
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the thought distraction condition were able to perform the distraction strategy. This line
of reasoning suggests that it is worthwhile to compare the two strategies, using a clinical
sample, which is thought to experience more severely negative self-referential thoughts.
It is also possible that the lack of a functional difference between defusion and
distraction conditions can be attributed to the inadequacy of the believability measure.
Using the believability measure, the current study attempted to capture the degree to
which a thought is experienced as a mental event, regardless of the literal content of the
thought (Hayes et al., 2006). However, it was extremely likely that participants viewed
the believability measure as a scale of “how true or valid the content of the thought is.”
One suggestion for future research is to change the anchor and verbal instruction of
believability scale, from “how believable (true) is the thought?” to “how much do you
experience the thought simply as a mental event, rather than as an absolute fact about
you?” Another suggestion is to employ an alternative acceptance- and process-oriented
measure, such as “how OK is it for you to have this thought?” in order to distinguish it
from a content-based believability measure (i.e., veracity of thought). These alternative
measures may be sensitive enough to capture the process of cognitive defusion.
Another notable finding is that much greater variability (SDs) of discomfort and
believability scores were seen at post-intervention than at pre-intervention across all
intervention groups. These results clearly reveal that there were larger inter-individual
differences at post-intervention, and suggest that the manipulations had varying effects
across participants. It is speculated that the variability might have been due to preintervention levels of discomfort and believability, participants’ coping repertoire for
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difficult thoughts (e.g., coping strategies), demand characteristics, participants’
psychological characteristics, learning history, and other unknown factors.
The present study has other conceptual and methodological limitations. The active
conditions in the present study consisted of multiple components, and it is unclear which
components or combination of components is responsible for changes in the stimulus
function of the negative self-referential thoughts. However, given the results of other
focused studies (e.g., Masuda et al., 2009; McMullen et al., 2008; Takahashi, Muto,
Tada, & Sugiyama, 2002), the experiential part of an acceptance exercise seems to be
crucial in the functional change of private events. The present study also did not examine
the impact of actual repetition of the target thought alone, although research on semantic
satiation (Esposito & Pelton, 1971) suggests that word repetition without a rationale is
unlikely to produce favorable effects.
Similar to many focused experimental studies, follow-up assessments were not
included in this investigation. Although this can be considered a limitation, the long-term
effects of this particular defusion technique may not be as important as showing that the
process is useful in particular contexts. The purpose of defusion exercises is not to alter
or defuse the meaning or function of target thoughts permanently. In fact, the meaning
and function of a given thought is contextually determined and it is hoped that the client
can maintain some level of contextual control over the meaning and function of all
thoughts. Defusion exercises simply help the client experience that the emotional
impact/meaning, with which negative self-referential thoughts typically accompany, is
not absolute or inherent, and that a negative self-referential thought can be experienced as
it is as a thought, rather than as what it says it is (Hayes et al., 1999). For this reason, the
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effects of the present defusion exercise, and other defusion techniques, need not be longlasting, and yet they still provide clients with a new experience and thereby new learning.
Methodologically, relative to the cognitive defusion condition, the thought
distraction condition still had greater variability. During the intervention phase, the
participants in the distraction condition were instructed to perform the distraction strategy
by thinking about something different. While the participants received the identical
instructions, the content of the private events used for the distraction strategy varied
across participants. Although the manipulation check administered for the thought
distraction condition suggested that the condition served its purpose, additional
methodological control in the thought distraction strategy (i.e., pre-determining the
stimulus used for distraction) seems warranted. It is also important to note that the verbal
prompt used for the distraction condition during the actual exercise (i.e., “don’t think
about it!”) appeared more closely related to a suppression strategy than a distraction
method.
Another less systematized area of the study was the use of multiple experimenters.
Although a closely scripted intervention was employed and statistical analyses did not
reveal a significant effect of experimenter, variations in the characteristics of
experimenters, such as their interaction style with participants were highly likely. The
audio-taped or video-taped recording of intervention sessions is recommended for
adherence checks in future research.
Furthermore, to minimize the variability in each intervention condition, the use of
a computerized program may be useful as an alternative mode of experimental procedure
for future research. The present investigation used a contact-based format in order to
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maintain a therapeutic atmosphere in an analogue research setting. However, a more
standardized procedure, such as the use of a computerized program or audio-taped
intervention, may be important to systematically manipulate the variables of interests.
Finally, perhaps the major limitation of the present study is the exclusive reliance
on self-report measures. From an ACT perspective, discomfort and believability of
private events are functional processes, and they should be studied within the context of
ongoing stimulus-behavior relations. Self-report type methods do not measure these
processes directly when they occur. It is difficult to directly assess the stimulus function
of the negative self-referential thought, thus, the development of behavioral methodology
that captures the function of self-referential thoughts seems extremely important.
In sum, despite these limitations, the present investigation is the first study that
shows the superior effects of the defusion procedure over a thought distraction strategy, a
commonly used coping strategy by psychotherapy clients. The present findings are
encouraging, and further investigations on the process and effects of a cognitive defusion
approach seem warranted.
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Table 1
Average Scores, Standard Deviations, and Effect Sizes of Emotional Discomfort and
Believability of Negative Self-Referential Thoughts by Condition and Time

Emotional Discomfort
Pre

Post

Believability

Pre-Post

Pre-Post
Pre

Conditions:
1. Cognitive Defusion (n = 31)

2. Thought Distraction (n = 38)

3. Control (n = 34)

Post

within d
77.65

38.81

(13.25)

(24.76)

78.03

52.17

(11.04)

(24.89)

75.50

63.29

(9.89)

(18.70)

1.70

1.39

1.36

within d
73.16

39.10

(14.49)

(27.69)

80.11

59.11

(14.44)

(26.34)

79.41

70.62

(16.33)

(24.70)

Between Condition Cohen’s d
Condition 1 vs. Condition 2

-.54

-.74

Condition 1 vs. Condition 3

-1.13

-1.20

Condition 2 vs. Condition 3

-.51

-.45

1.60

1.47

1.60
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Table 2
Average Scores, Standard Deviations, and Effect Sizes of Emotional Discomfort and
Believability of Negative Self-Referential Thoughts and Beck Depression Inventory-II by
Condition and Time among Participants with Elevated Depressive Symptom

Emotional Discomfort
Pre

Post

(n = 14)

2. Thought Distraction
(n = 10)

3. Control
(n = 18)

Pre

Post

within d

Conditions:
1. Cognitive Defusion

Pre-Post

83.71

43.36

(11.10)

(28.87)

82.90

52.60

(10.16)

(32.85)

76.00

64.00

(6.88)

(15.44)

1.90

1.16

.87

BDI-II

Believability
Pre-Post
within d

77.21

42.21

(13.60)

(27.11)

80.80

52.60

(17.42)

(33.18)

81.33

67.94

(16.25)

(24.79)

Between Condition Cohen’s d

Cond. 1 vs. Cond. 2

-.30

-.65

Cond. 1 vs. Cond. 3

-.93

-.99

Cond. 2 vs. Cond. 3

-.47

-.22

Note: BDI-II = Beck Depression Inventory-II; Cond. = Condition

1.30

20.74
(8.42)

.61

17.70
(8.51)

.67

15.38
(4.80)
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Figure Caption
Figure 1. Means of emotional discomfort and believability of negative self-referential
thoughts at pre and post by condition.
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